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INTR OD UC TION
In the wake of the North American Treaty Organization
("NATO") military intervention in Libya pursuant to United
Nations ("UN") Security Council Resolution 1973
* Authors' names appear by alphabetical order. Authors are Lecturers at the Law
Faculty of Ono Academic College, Isracl
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commentators celebrated the triumph of the responsibility to
protect principle. This principle envisions collective action
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the "Charter") "should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities . . .
manifestly fail[] to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. " A year
later, in the face of complete inaction on the part of the Security
Council ("SC"), this principle lies under the rubble of Homs,
Hama, and Aleppo, with a death toll in Syria that exceeds 60,000
according to UN estimates.3
Is the intervention in Libya after all a pyrrhic victory for the
proponents of SC-authorized humanitarian interventions,
contributing to the paralysis of the SC in the Syrian crisis and
increasing the prospects of SC inaction in similar cases to come?
Answering this question in the affirmative, many commentators
have pointed out the profound crisis of trust among permanent
members of the SC arising from the military intervention in
Libya, as Russia and China adopted the position of many
international lawyers that the operations of NATO powers in
Libya grossly exceeded the mandate provided by Resolution
1973.4 According to this argument, NATO powers have
1. S.C. Res. 1973, 11 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
2. 2005 World Summit Outcome. G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 139. U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Sept. 16, 2005); see Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Says Security
Council Action on Libya Affirms International Community's Deterinination to Protect
Civilians from Own Government's Violence, U.N. Press Release SC/10201 (Mar. 17,
2011); Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock ojtheReponibil to Protect, 48 STAN.J. INT'L IL. 319
(2012) ("In recent months, following on the decision of the U.N. Security Council to
impose a no-fly zone in Libya in response to escalating violence against civilians,
observers have elevated the status of the responsibility to protect forn notable
development to triumphant achievement."); Gareth Evans, End of the Argumient: How We
Won the Debate Over Stopping Genocide, FORLIGN POL'Y (Nov. 28, 2011).
http: //m.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/ 2011/ 11/ 28/ gareth evans end of the argurn
Cen.
3. Data Suggests Syria Death Toll Count Could Be MWore Than 60,000, Says UN Human
Rights Office, UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 2, 2013), http:,/,/mTun.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewslD=43866.
4. See Editorial, A Black Hole in the Systen of Collective Securit,. 16 J. CONLICT &
SECURITY L. 415, 415-16 (2011) [hereinafter A Black Hole]; Chris Keeler, The End oj the
Responsibility to Protect?, FORLIGN POL'Y J. (Oct. 12 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/12/the-end-of-thc-responsibility-to-
protect ("The failure to pass a resolution on Syria is directly related to the actions of
the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO-led intervention in Libya, during
which the United States and its allies overtly overstepped the UN [United Nations]
mandate authorizing action."). Explaining Russia's determination to veto any proposed
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"hijacked" an SC authorization to use force issued for the
exclusive purpose of protecting civilians, and used it as a vehicle
to promote the far more ambitious political end of affecting a
regime change in Libya.5 As a result, the NATO intervention in
Libya "has created a general cloud of suspicion surrounding
western humanitarian efforts that will continue to be an obstacle
to the implementation of the [responsibility to protect] doctrine
elsewhere."6
Security Council ("SC") resolution that hints at the possibility of future sanctions on
Syria, the Russian foreign ministry released the following statement: "The situation in
Syria cannot be considered in the Security Council in isolation from the Libyan
experience. The international community is wary of the statements being heard that
the implementation of the Security Council resolutions in Libya as interpreted by
NATO is a model for its future actions to exercise the 'responsibility to protect.' Its not
hard to imagine that tomorrow 'united defenders' may begin to apply this 'exemplary
model' in Syria as well." Id. The foreign ministry of China has condemned the NA'XTO
intervention in Libya as "an abuse" of force. Ananth Kiishnan & Sandeep Dikshit, India
and China Had Sinilar Considerations on Libra, HIN u (Chennai), Mar. 3, 2011. available
at http://www.hindu.con/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl-file=2011032666941600; see Vijay
Prashed, Interview with Hardeep Singh Puri, Permanent Representative of India to the Uhnited
Nations, FRONTLINE, Mar. 10-23. 2012. available at http://wwwflonnet.com/fl2905/
stories/ 20120323290505700.htn (noting that representative of India to the UN
observed, "Because of the Libyan experience other members of the Security Council,
such as China and Russia, will not hesitate in exercising a veto if a
resolution ... contains actions under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which permits the
use of force and punitive and coercive measures"): see also Micah Zenko, By
Overreaching in Libya, NATO Has Left Syria to Fend Alone, NATIONAL (Abu Dhabi) (Oct.
I1, 2011), http://wwv.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/by-
overreaching-in-libya-nato-has-left-syria-to-fend-alone (observing that in view of the
North American Treaty Organization ("NATO") operations in Libya, which exceeded
the scope of Resolution 1973, "the UN has been unwilling to endorse intervention in
Syria.... In June, Russian President Dnitry Mcdvcdcv delayed a Security Council
resolution condemning Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, stating he would not support
'a dead ringer for Resolution 1973,' which he believed had been 'turned into a scrap of
paper to cover up a pointless military operation.' On October 4 Russia and China
vetoed a sanctions resolution").
5. See, e.g:, Marcelo Kohen, The Principle of Non-Intervention 25 Years After the
Nicaragua Judgment 25 LTIDENJ. INT'L L. 157, 162 (2012) (observing that "the NXTO
bombings cearly deviated from its original goal to protect the civilian population by
actively supporting one side of the internal armed conflict between the National
Transition Council and the Gaddafi dictatorship," and that the means by which NATO
powers toppled the Gaddafi regime "could hax vily influence the future of Libya");
Julian M. Lehmann, All Necessary Means to Protect Ci ilians: What the Intervention in Libya
Says About the Relationship Between theJus in Bello and theJus ad Bellum, 17.J. CONFLICT
& SLC. L. 117. 145 (2012) (" [T]hcre were ... actions casting doubt on the genuine
implementation of the mandate to protect civilians. In this regard, the outright support
of the rebels, by rejecting cease fires, open claims that regime change was striven for,
tihe provision of weapons and support by military advisors, was highly problematic.").
6. Keeler, supra note 4.
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The present article proposes a reform in the practice of the
SC that would promote consonance between the aims of an SC
authorization to use force and measures taken by states acting
upon such authorization ("Operating States"). This reform
should ameliorate, as much as possible, the crisis of trust that is
paralyzing the collective security mechanism. The article
suggests establishing an oversight mechanism within the SC
system that would significantly reduce the ability of states to rely
on an SC resolution authorizing the use of force to conduct
military operations that depart from the terms of such
authorization.
Commentators have lamented the character of the SC as an
entity completely subjected to the foreign policy considerations
of its permanent members, "designed to operate in their
interest as individual, powerful states, not in the interest of the
international community. "7 Clearly, the crisis of trust among
permanent SC members, resulting from the lack of SC control
over the execution of its resolutions,8 is by no means the only
reason for SC inaction in many cases. A range of foreign policy
interests of SC members (e.g., inter-state alliances and economic
or security interests) arising in relation to one crisis or another
may preclude an otherwise forthcoming SC action even in the
absence of such a crisis. But the practice of the SC demonstrates
that "agreement on Security Council action has often been
reached despite the fact that it ran counter to the interests of
particular Permanent Members, and this has happened even in
the absence of immediate compensation."
The current crisis of trust does not revolve around the
regular obstacles of realpolitik, which may prevent the adoption
of a resolution authorizing the use of force in one case or
another, but rather around the concerns of permanent
members of the SC that resolutions would be abused by
7. Ian Hurd, The Security Councilin a Changing World, INT'l RELATIONS & SEC.
NETWORK (July 9, 2012), http://ww.isn.cthz.clh/isn/Digital-Library/Special-Featire/
Detail?1ng en&id= 145324&contextid774= 145324&contextid775= 145318&tabid= 145248
1000.
8. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
9. Nico Krisch, The Security Council and the Great Powers, in THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL AND W AR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945
141 (Vaughan Lowe CL al., eds., 2008). Krisch points in this regard to "Chinese
acceptance of sanctions against Libya despite early resistance." Id. at 141, n.43.
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Operating States. In theory, any resolution may be hijacked,
therefore these concerns can lead to complete inaction and
permanent paralysis of the SC. Commentators have thus noted
that in the absence of reform promoting SC control over the
implementation of SC authorizations to use force "it is most
likely that no Security Council mandate is forthcoming in future
in other pressing cases like that of Syria. The system of collective
security thereby risks being held back in ways similar to the
deadlock of Cold War days."10
Indeed, statements made by Russian and Chinese officials
seem to suggest that the SC would not have adopted Resolution
1973 under political circumstances that resemble the present
crisis of trust." Part I will describe the lack of control that the SC
has over the implementation of its resolutions authorizing the
use of force, which underlies the current crisis. The current
legal literature regarding the possible means of promoting this
control has mainly advocated the inclusion of highly specific
terms in the resolution, stipulating the scope of the permission
to use force.1 2 Part II will point out weaknesses of such a
measure that would significantly diminish its political feasibility
and render it ill-suited to promote consonance between the
purpose of the resolution and the measures taken by the
Operating States.
A politically feasible reform that would introduce
meaningful guarantees against the hijacking of SC resolutions
authorizing the use of force must seek to minimize political costs
for both permanent SC members and other states acting in
10. SeeA Black Hole, supra note 4, at 416; see also Lehmann, supra note 5, at 145 ("A
m1ore restrained application of the mandate in Libya would not only have brought
intervening states in greater compliance wvith international law, but would also have
been preferable fron the political perspective of achieving future consensus on
protecting civilians."); Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Securit Council:
Ambiguous Authorations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and theIraqi Inspeci on Regime, 93 AM.j.
INT'L L. 124, 129-30 (1999) ("if contractee states refuse to accept clear limitations on
the scope and duration of their delegated authority, construe unclcar Security Council
language to imply authority to use force where no such authority was intended, or
stretch the terms of their contracted authority beyond what most Council menbers
support, the result may be increased reluctance to contract out the use of force. The
consequence of such a conflict in the current geopolitical circumstances wvould be to
undermine the Security Council's rolk in multilateral collective security.").
11. See supra note 4.
12. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
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pursuance of an SC authorization to use force. The present
article takes up this challenge by bringing together the "culture
of law" and the "ethos of diplomats." Part III will set forth a
mechanism whereby a permanent UN committee of legal
experts (the "Committee") would monitor the compatibility of
military operations undertaken by a state pursuant to an SC
resolution with the terms of the resolution. Part III will also lay
out the procedure that the Committee would follow to perform
its monitoring role, drawing to some extent on SC practice of
establishing committees to monitor the implementation of
sanctions. 14
Should the Committee find that the military measures
taken by Operating States exceeded the terms of the SC
resolution authorizing the use of force, it would then submit
clarifications to the SC regarding the scope of the permission to
use force authorized by the resolution. These clarifications may
include general legal guidelines (e.g., "the resolution authorizes
the use of force only against armed forces that present an
imminent threat to civilians") as well as operative
recommendations with regard to acts that Operating States
should take or refrain from taking in order to bring their
operations in line with the resolution. The clarifications issued
by the Committee would be binding upon all states as the
authentic interpretation of the resolution authorizing the use of
force, unless rejected within two weeks of their submission by an
SC resolution adopted in accordance with its regular voting
rules.'1
This Article argues that the establishment of the proposed
oversight mechanism does not require an amendment to the
UN Charter, and that such legislative course is not advisable in
view of efficiency considerations. Rather, the legal premise of
the proposed mechanism is Aiticle 29 of the United Nations
13. We borrow these terms from J.H.H. Weiler's analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of the juridification of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute
resolution system. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule oJ Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of VTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD
TRAIDL 191, 198-99 (2001).
14. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
15. Article 27 of the UN Charter provides that SC resolutions "bc made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permaneLLn
members." U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
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Charter, which authorizes the SC to "establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions." 16
The SC currently delegates its powers to subsidiary organs
"for a specified question." 7 By amending its Provisional Rules of
Procedure, however, it can establish a permanent committee
and grant it the powers necessary for operation of the proposed
mechanism, including the power of authentic interpretation of
SC resolutions."'
It is important to delineate the boundaries of our inquiry.
We do not aim to examine the legal limitations imposed on the
powers of the SCU or the appropriate scope ofjudicial oversight
of the exercise of such powers. 0 Moreover, the present article
16. Id. art. 29.
17. Rule 28, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/96/Rev.7 (Dec. 21, 1982) [hereinafter SC Provisional Rule 28]. available at
http:,//vw.un.org/docs/sc/scrules.htm.
18. Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Securit Council Resolutions, MAX PLANCK
Y.B. oF U.N. L. 71, 82-84 (1998) ("Only the Security Council, or some body authorized
to do so by the Council, may give an authentic interpretation in the true sense ... the
decisions of the subsidiary organs are binding to the extent provided for in the relevant
SCRs."). See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
19. For an extensive review of the legal literature and the jurisprudence of
international tribunals addressing the lkgal limitations on SC powers see Joy Gordon,
The Sword of Danocles: Revisiting the Question of Whether the United Nations Securty Council
is Bound by InternationalLaw, 12 CHTJ. INT'L L. 605 (2012). The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") held in the Tadic Case, " [t]he Security
Council is ... subjected to certain constitutional limitations. however broad its powers
under the constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits
of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific
limitations or those which may derive from the internal division of power within the
Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the
Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law)." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 28
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
In the Lockerbie case, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") refrained from
determining whether, and to what extent, international law imposes limitations on the
powers of the SC. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from Acrial Incident at Lockerbic (Libya Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.).
Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 114. 1 42 (Apr. 14).
20. See id.; see also jose E. Alvarez,Judging the Security Council, 90 AM.J. INT'l 1. 1, 4
(1996) (reviewing the controversy among commentators concerning the question of
International Court of Justice oversight of SC actions); Gordon, supra note 19, at 636
(reviewing the jurisprudence of the International Court of justice ("IC]"), the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY'), the European
Court of Justice ("E(J"), and the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"),
Gordon concludes that "the courts are showing increasing willingness not only to
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does not aim to explore means of alleviating legitimacy concerns
regarding the powers of the SC under the UN Charter, its
structure, and the veto power conferred upon permanent SC
members.1
These inquiries, addressed extensively in current legal
literature,22 are beyond the scope of this article. Rather, it
proposes a politically feasible reform in the practice of the SC,
which would alleviate the crisis of trust currently hindering the
functioning of the SC and promote consonance between the
purpose of an SC mandate authorizing the use of force and the
measures taken by Operating States.
1. THE AUTHORIZATION MODEL AND ITS FLAWS
This is not the way the story was meant to unfold. The
drafters of the UN Charter envisioned "a centralization of the
use of armed forces, with member states placing forces under
comment upon the legality of Chapter VI I measures, but also to issue rulings that
effectively block implementation of the Security Council neasures").
21. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87
AM. J. INT'I L 552, 562 (1993) (observing that "the two broad dimensions of the
challenge to the legitinacy of the Security Council's use of its authority reflect the
perceptions (1) that the Council is dominated by a few states, and (2) that the veto
held by the permanent members is unfair."); Bart M.. Szewczyk, Variable Wultipolarity
and UN. Security Council Reform. 53 HARV. INT'L L. J. 449, 455-58 (2012) (reviewing
critiques concerning the legitinacy of the Security Council ("SC")). See generally
Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposalsfor UN Security Council Refor 99 Am. j. INT'L L. 632 (2005);
Kanrul Hossain, The Challenge and Prospect of Secuity Council Reform, 7 RFGENTJ. INTI
L. 299, 308 (2010); W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the hited Nations,
87 AM.j. INT'Tl I. 83 (1993).
22. See supra notes 20-21 and accomrpanying text: see generally Malcolm N. Shaw,
The Security Council and the Intern ational Court offustice:Judicial Drift and Judicial Function,
in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF jU STICE: ITs FU TURE ROLE AFTER FTFTY TARS 219,
230 (A.S. Muller ct al., eds., 1997); Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the
International Court, and Judicial Review: Wat Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
517, 518-19 (1999); Gabriel H. Oosthuizen, Playing the Devil's Advocate: The Security
Council is Uhnbound by Law, 12 LFIDFNJ. INT'l 1. 549, 562-63 (1999); I)apo Akande, The
International Court of fustice and the Security Council: 1s There Room for judicial Control of
Decisions of the Political Organs of the Unid Nations?, 46 INT'T & COMP I. Q. 309, 314
(1997); Judith G. Gardain, Legal Restraints on Securit Council Ailitary Enforcement Action.
17 MICH.J. INTIL L. 285, 303 (1996) [hereinafter Gardam. Legal Restraints]; Thomas M.
Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation" Wiho is the Ultimate Guardian of, the N Legality?, 86
AM. J. INTIL L. 519. 522 (1992); August Reinisch, Note, Developing Human Rights and
Humanitarian Lawo Accountabiity of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic
Sactoios, 95 A m.j. INTI L. 851, 855 (2001).
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the control of the Security Council . . . ."2 The collective
security mechanism established under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter allows the SC to resort to coercive measures in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security if it
identifies, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, "the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression . . . ."2 If the SC is satisfied that non-military
measures have been or will be inadequate, it may take military
action "[A]s may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security" in accordance with Article 42
of the Charter.25 Article 43 of the Charter required member
states to "make available to the Security Council, on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed
forces . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security."26 The Charter contemplated
that such forces be placed "at the disposal of the Security
Council"27 , and be strategically directed by a Military Staff
Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent
members of the SC.28
But practice has departed from the language of the
Charter, and Article 43 has become a dead letter, " as
"agreements of the sort contemplated by Article 43 have never
been concluded, the Military Staff Committee has never gained
significance, and the Charter's centralized mechanism of
military enforcement has never been implemented in
practice."so
23. Mehrdad Payandeh, The U nited Nations, Ailitary I ntervention, and Regime Change
in Libya. 52 VA.J. INTL L. 355 366 (2012).
24. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
25. Id. art. 42.
26. Id. art. 43, para. 1.
27. Id. art. 47, para. 3.
28. Id.
29. Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 68 (Lori Fisler
Danrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
30. Payandch, supra note 23, at 366-67: see Schachter, supra note 29, at 68
("Article 43, though drafted in obligatory language, has never been applied. The
Security Council has not taken the initiative to negotiate such special agreements
though Article 43 requires that this be done 'as soon as possible.' It does not appear
that any member state requested such negotiation.").
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In view of the failure of the international community to
carry out the scheme stipulated in Ar ticle 43, the SC resorted to
the current model of authorizing member states to use force, "in
essence franchising UN members to act in the Organization's
behalf."31 In using its powers under Article 42 of the Charter to
resort to military enforcement measures, "the United Nations
has . . . thus become only an authorizing body, ceding control
of the actual military operations to individual states."32
Indeed, "the 'black hole' in the system of collective
security" 3 underlying the current crisis of trust concerns the
inability of the SC to control the execution of its resolutions. 34
The lack of such control was evident during the First Gulf War, a
US-led military intervention carried out pursuant to SC
Resolution 678 authorizing UN members "to use all necessary
means" to end the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and "to restore
international peace and security in the area."3 5 The lack of the
SC's ability to control the execution of its resolutions was even
more prominent in the face of the US and British argument that
the mandate to use force granted by Resolution 678 remained in
31. See Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 126. Addressing the authorization model,
Thomas Franck observed that "the adaptive capacity of the Charter has functioned
dramatically and controversially to fill the vacuum created by Artice 43's non-
implementation .... The gradual emancipation of Article 42 as a free-standing
authority for deploying collective force, ad hoc, has prevented the collapse of the
Charter system in the absence of the standby militia envisioned by Ar tice 43." THOIAS
M. FRANCK. RLCOURSL To FORCL: STATE ACTION AGAINST THRLATS AND ARMLD
ATTACKS 23 (2002).
32. See Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10. at 126.
33. A Black Hole, supra note 4, at 416.
34. Id.
35. S.C. Res. 678, 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). Noting the lack of
Security Council control over the implementation of Resolution 678, Burns Weston
observed that "the resolution did not require any meaningful accounting to, or
guidance from, the Security Council . . . . In other words, in Resolution 678, the
Security Council gave the UN members carte blanche vis- -vis Iraq after January 15,
including the waging of war on whatever terms and in whatever ways they might
choose." Burns H. Weston, Securit Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making Precarious Legitimac, 85 AM . .INTL L. 516, 525-26 (1991); see John Quigley,
The Un ited States and the U, ited Nations in the Persian Gulf Var: New Order or Disorder?, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 28 (1992) ("As matters stood, the Council could only sit back and
hope the states taking action were not doing more than was needed. This absence of
Security Council control violated the requirements of Chapter VII."). Some have
suggested that as a result of such lack of SC control over the military operation, the
United States resorted to military force in a manner exceeding the authorization
provided by Resolution 678. Id. at 12, 18-19.
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force even after the cease-fire marking the end of the First Gulf
War.36 This argument, advanced by the United States and the
United Kingdom despite vigorous opposition by three
permanent members of the SC and many other states, served as
the legal premise for a series of military operations against Iraq,
culminating in the Second Gulf War in 2003.3 Commentators
observed that the approach followed by the United States and
the United Kingdom exemplifies the problematic nature of the
authorization regime, which "leaves individual states with wide
discretion to use ambiguous, open-textured resolutions to
exercise control over the initiation, conduct and termination of
hostilities. Such states may seek to apply resolutions by the
Security Council in conflict with its aims and objectives or the
view of many of its members." 8
Similarly, regarding the recent military intervention in
Libya it was observed that "[t]hrough the authorization of the
36. At the heart of the US and UK argument lay the assertion that "Resolution
678 ... contains no self-imposed time limit, and none of the resolutions relating to
Iraq ... explicitly terminated the resolution's endorsement of the use of force. Unless
the Security Council had clearly stated, using the same language that it has in the past,
that it has terminated Resolution 678's authorization for the use of force, any such
authorization continued." john Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM J.
INT'L L. 563, 568 (2003).
37. The US and UK argument relied on the joint reading of three SC Resolutions:
(a) Resolution 678, which authorized UN members "to use all necessary means" to end
the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and "to restore international peace and security in the
area"; (b) Resolution 687, adopted in April 1991, which established the terms of the
cease-fire terminating hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Resolution 687 required Iraq, inter
alia, to destroy its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and agree to
on-site inspections; (c) Resolution 1441 of November 2002, which found that Iraq has
"materially breached" its obligations under those terms of the cease-fire. See S.C. Res.
678, supra note 35, at 1 2; S.C. Res. 1441. 1 1. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002);
S.C. Res. 687, 1[ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). A reading of the said
resolutions that supports the legality of the Second Gulf War maintains that
"Resolution 1441's finding that Iraq was in material breach allowed the United States
and its allies to terminate the cease-fire created by Resolution 687 and resume the use
of force as authorized by Resolution 678." Yoo, supra note 36, at 568; see also Lord
Goldsmith, Attorney General Clarifies Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq (Mar. 18,
2003), http://www.fco.gov.uk/cn/news/?view=Spccch&id5424753 (statement in
answer to a parliamentary question); William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald,
Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AMJ. INTL L. 557 (2003). Yet a large segment
of the international community adhered to the view of prominent international lawyers
that this reading of the resolutions was unsustainable. See Thomas M. Franc , What
Happens Now? The hited Nations After Iraq, 97 ANM J. INTL L. 607, 612-14 (2003): Sean
D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality oflivadingIraq, 92 GLO. L.J. 173. 177 (2004).
38. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 125.
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use of force in the case of Libya, the Security Council, to a
considerable degree, transferred its Chapter VII powers to the
intervening states. It retained neither authority nor control over
the intervention."39
The amenability of SC mandates to abuse turns largely on
"the irrevocability of a Security Council mandate once given."11
This is the result of the "reverse veto" power, which allows
permanent members of the SC to block an SC resolution
revoking, revising, or clarifying an authorization to use force
after such authorization has been issued by the SC.41 Thus, in
the case of the military intervention in Libya, "the very fact that
the USA (initially), the UK and France, all members of the
Security Council with a veto right, were involved in the exercise
of this Security Council mandate, and were involved in the
bombing of Libya . . . automatically led to a Security Council
that would not be able to fulfill its task of supervising the way the
mandate was being implemented."2
Commentators have proposed divesting permanent SC
members of their reverse veto power as a means of promoting
SC control over the implementation of its resolutions. David
Caron advocated the introduction of such reform by
incorporating in every resolution adopted under Chapter VII "a
modified voting procedure for future use in terminating the
action taken."4 3
Under the modified voting clause, "the required affirmative
votes should probably be higher than the nine required as an
initial matter, but not so high, say fourteen, as virtually to
perpetuate the present situation regarding the reverse veto."44
Others have voiced a similar opinion.45
39. Payandeh, supra note 23, at 400.
40. A Black Hole, supra note 4. at 416.
41. See id.; Payandeh, supra note 23, at 400; Caron, supra note 21, at 577
(observing that "'reverse veto' does not block the Security Council fron authorizing or
ordering an action but. rather, blocks it from terminating or otherwise altering an
action it has already authorized or ordered.").
42. A Black Hole, supra note 4, at 415-16.
43. Caron, supra note 21, at 584.
44. Id. at 586.
45. See, e.g., ERIKA DE TVET. THL CHAPTER 7I POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SLCURITY COUNCIL 45, 270 (2004) (proposing an amendment to tre current,
authorization regime, whereby "the authorization to use force will cease when it
MANDATE TO USE FORCE
Abolishment of the reverse veto would clearly enhance the
responsiveness of the SC to changed circumstances that in the
opinion of a significant majority of SC members warrant the
revocation or revision of action previously taken by the SC. Such
circumstances may include, among others, alleged
overstretching of SC mandates committed or sanctioned by at
least one permanent member opposing the revision of prior SC
action.46
However, review of SC practice over the two decades
following Caron's proposal shows no indication of a willingness
by permanent members of the SC to cede reverse veto power in
the context of major, high-stakes conflicts.4  In contrast to the
proposal advanced below, revoking reverse veto power could
result in the revocation of the mandate altogether, requiring
intervening states to incur the political costs associated with a
withdrawal from a military operation that is already underway.
The prospects of intervening states assuming the risk of such a
high political cost seem remote, especially given the fact that
such a risk depends on the discretion of a purely political
decision-maker that is the SC.
Furthermore, revoking the reverse veto may do little to
alleviate the crisis of trust undermining the collective security
becomes clear that it does not enjoy the support of the majority of Security Council
members anymore, including a majority of the permanent members").
46. A Black Hole, supra note 4. at 416 (pointing to claims that the execution of
Resolution 1973 led to violations of humanitarian law and human rights law and that
the mandate provided by the resolution "was interpreted in such a way to also allow for
regime change," the Editorial obscived: " [t]he very fact that the USA (initially), the UK
and France, all members of the Security Council with a veto right, were involved in the
exercise of this Security Council mandate, and were involved in the bombing of Libya,
this automatically led to a Security Council that would not be able to fulfill its task of
supervising the way the mandate was being implemented"); see Caron, supra note 21, at
587 (proposing to repeal the reverse veto). Caron mainly addressed concerns beyond
overstretches of prior resolutions. For instance, Caron contended that doing away with
reverse veto "would be desirable in terms of the objectives of sanctions [(imposed by
the SC under Chapter 7Ii-the authors]) in that it would enable the state targeted by
the sanctions to act with a view to ending them. For if the target state and its Citizenry
conclude that, no matter what they do, the sanctions wvill remain in place because of
the wishes of one or two permanent members, they may simply stiffen their resistance
and reject further efforts to satisfy what they see as an unreasonable and unresponsive
Council" Id.
47. See Tarcisio Gazzini, THE CHANGIN, RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL L.Aw 53 (2005) (observing that Caron's proposal "implies a significant
reduction of the veto power unlikely to be accepted by permanent members").
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mechanism because military action perceived by certain
permanent SC members to exceed the SC mandate may
nevertheless gain the support of the majority of Council
members. Because the adoption of SC resolutions requires the
agreement of all permanent members of the SC, each
permanent member would consider the resolution to be
"hijacked" if the use of force exceeded its own understanding of
the mandate. For example, in the Libyan crisis, if a revised
voting clause along the lines proposed by Caron had been
included in Resolution 1973, it would not have saved the
mandate from its NATO "hijackers" as far as the Russians and
Chinese were concerned because the military intervention
retained the support of a significant number of SC members
throughout the conflict.
II. IACREASED SPECIFICATIONS OF AUTHORIZATIONS TO
USE FORCE?
Commentators have long maintained that fundamental
values underpinning the UN Charter-"that peaceful means be
used to resolve disputes and that force be used in the interest
and under the control of the international community and not
individual countries" 4 8-require that the SC retain strict control
over the implementation of resolutions authorizing the use of
force.49
It has been suggested that such control could be
accomplished by highly specified terms qualifying the SC
mandate, stipulated in the resolution, which would ensure that
"contractee states employ force to secure the UN objectives and
not their own."5 11 According to this view, "[m]aintaining the
control of the Council over the warfare it authorizes requires
that, although operational command may be delegated to states,
major policy changes in objectives, or major military actions that
48. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 125.
49. See id. at 127 (submitting that "the Security Council must retain clear control
over authorizations to use force ... even if political and military considerations require
that it delegate military cominand to individual nations"); DE WET, supra note 45, at
265-66 ("A complete delegation of command and control of a military operation to a
member state or a group of states, without any accountability to the Security Council,
would ... open the door to abuse by states who claim to be acting on behalf of the
United Nations whilst (exclusively) pursuing their own national interests.").
50. L obel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 127.
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seriously threaten to widen the war, must be authorized by the
United Nations."51
This approach was initially advanced in the wake of the First
Gulf War in response to the legal controversy regarding the
scope of permission to use force against Iraq under SC
Resolution 678.52 The approach gained support in the legal
literature in light of the recent legal controversy about the
international military intervention in Libya. Commentators have
noted with regard to SC Resolution 1973 that " [t]he notion of
'all necessary means' remains ambiguous, clearer mandates are
thus desirable." 3 Hence, "the Security Council should have
defined the objective of Resolution 1973 and the means
acceptable to accomplish this objective in more detail."
Is increased specification of SC resolutions authorizing the
use of force an advisable means of reducing the uncertainty that
follows the adoption of such resolutions? We believe that the
answer is negative, primarily because the uncertainty inherent to
war makes it impossible to anticipate the range of actions that
would be consistent with the principle of proportionality.
A. Proportionality and Uncertainty in War
The most substantial impediment to the drafting of an SC
mandate containing highly specified terms for the use of force is
the interaction between the principle of proportionality and the
element of uncertainty in war. Efforts to promote consonance
between the purpose of an SC mandate and the measures
employed by the Operating States concern the realization of the
principle of proportionality. Proportionality, which "determines
the amount of force that can legitimately be used to achieve the
51. Id. at 139. Lobel and Ratner further submit that a "change in objectives poses
grave risks of wvidening the wvar, a risk that eventuated in Korea. Because of those risks,
Security Council resolutions must be interpreted to authorize what was clearly
intended, not what can conceivably be justified." Id.: see DE NVET, supra note 45, at 269
(submitting that an SC resolution authorizing the use of force -should specify clearly
the extent, nature and objective of the Imilitary action, since broad and indeterminate
language provides states with an opportunity to employ force for potentially limitiess
objectives").
52. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
53. Lehmann, supra note 5, at 145.
54. Payandeh, supra note 23, at 400.
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goal,"5 is a basic principle of the law on the use of force,56
enshrined in several provisions of the UN Charter.5 Thus,
"proportionality . . . ought to be a principle inherent in all
Chapter VII UNSC Resolutions."5s It was observed that use of
the term "all necessary measures" by the SC in resolutions
authorizing the use of force "imported a notion of
proportionality into the action being authorized."59 Moreover,
regardless of the extent to which proportionality places a legal
limitation on the powers of the SC,oo there is little disagreement
that the Council ought to act in accordance with this principle
as a matter of good policy.6'
The function of proportionality is "to limit the destructive
impact of armed conflict."62 In the context of jus ad bellum, such
destructive impact extends beyond injuries to civilians and
damage to civilian objects, and encompasses the destruction of
enemy forces and damage to territory, the infrastructure of the
target state, and the environment in general. It also concerns
55. Gardain, Legal Restraint, supra note 22, at 305.
56. Judith G. Gardam, Proporionalty and Forc in International Law,
87AM.J INTI 1. 391 (1993) [hereinafter Gardarn, Prpuotality and Force] (observing
that " [p]roportionality is a fundamental component of the law on the use of force").
57. j DITH G. GARDAM, NFCFSITY, PROPORTIONAI ITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 189 (2004) ("The constrains of proportionality are also recognized in the words
of Artidce 42 of the United Nations Charter in that 'the Council may only take such
[forceful] action . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security."). Gardam further submits that Ar tice 1(1) of the Charter, which requires UN
organs to operate in conformity with the principles of international law "can be viewed
as encompassing proportionality as a principle of general international law that is
applicable to all uses of force." Id. at 207; see Lehmann, supra note 5, at 132-33: THE
CHARTER OF THL UNITLD NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 631 (Bruno Sinna et al.. eds.. 1st
ed. 1994).
58. Lehmann, supra note 5. at 133; see Gardam, Proportionalit and Force, supra note
56, at 391; Christian Henderson. International Measures for the Protection of Civilians in
Libya and Cote d'voire, 60 INT'L & COMP I.Q. 767, 769 (2011).
59. Quigley, supra note 35, at 17 (observing that "the term 'necessaryI in
Resolution 678 imported a notion of proportionality into the action being
authorized").
60. See Wood, supra note 18; see also GARDAM, supra note 57, at 211-12 (arguing
that in exercising its powers the SC is bound by the principle of proportionality).
61. GARDAM, supra note 57, at 12 ("As with the unilateral resort to force, it is
generally assumed that any forceful action, either by United Nations forces under the
control and command of the United Nations or state forces acting in pursuance of
Security Council authorization, should be proportionate.").
62. Id. at 20.
63. See id. at 168 ("Integral to decisions relating to the choice of means and
methods of warfare and targets must be consideration of the anticipated overall scale of
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the undermining of international peace and the compromising
of state sovereignty that are inherent to any act of inter-state
belligerency.64 The requirement of proportionality presupposes
that each act of inter-state belligerency inherently compromises
a "constitutive principle of the United Nations, stated in the
Charter's stirring preamble: 'to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war.'"6
Therefore, application of this principle in the exercise of
SC powers under Chapter VII "ought to entail a functional
balancing test between the aim pursued and the means used
analogous to the standard in jus ad bellum on self-defence."66 In
the case of an SC-authorized humanitarian intervention,
proportionality requires balancing the expected benefit of a
military measure in thwarting threats to civilians with the costs of
the destructive effect inherent in any act of inter-state
belligerency.
Such a balancing requirement suggests that even when the
mandate allows the use of force to protect civilians, not any
benefit, however slight, in advancing this purpose would justify
all military measures necessary to achieve it. In other words, the
balancing test reflected in the principle of proportionality
requires accepting certain minor or remote risks to the civilian
population in order to restrain the use of force as far as
possible.67
civilian casualties, the level of destruction of the enemy forces, and finally damage to
territory, the infrastructure of the target state and the environment generally.");
Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence and the Conduct of lnternational Armed Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL LAw IN A TIME OF COMPLEXITY 273, 278 n.22 (Yoran Dinstein ed..
1989).
64. See GARDAM, supra note 57, at 208 (observing that one of the purposes of
proportionality is "to limit the impact of any forceftul action on the sovereign rights of a
delinquent State and helping to ensure a more lasting peace at the end of hostilities").
Gardan further noted that proportionality concerns "the minimization of the
disruption of international peace and security." Id. at 16.
65. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 128.
66. Lehinann, supra note 5, at 133.
67. Hence, while the demonstrated barbarity of the Gaddafi regime as well as
statements made by Gaddafi himself clearly indicated that the purpose of the mandate
could be fully realized only by affecting a regime change Western powers operating in
Libya expressly recognized that an attempt to affect regime change by force would fall
outside the scope of Resolution 1973. See Barack Obama et al., Op-Ed., Libya's Pathway
to Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, available at http://ww.nytiles.com/2011/04/15/
opinion/15iht-edlibyal5.tmlI ("Our duty and our mandate under UN Security Council
Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and wve are doing that. It is not to remove Gaddafi
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To examine the proportionality of military measures
contemplated by states engaged in SC-authorized humanitarian
intervention one must assess the gravity of the threat to the
civilian population in the absence of such measures. The
appropriate scope of permission to use force turns on such an
assessment.
Nevertheless, the element of uncertainty inherent in war
would significantly burden any proportionality analysis
conducted before the beginning of hostilities and aimed at
regulating the use of force throughout an armed conflict.
Therefore, the role of proportionality is never complete at the
time of the initial decision to resort to force. 8 Rather, "the
assessment of proportionality . . . is an ongoing process
throughout the conflict."G
The Libyan crisis is a case in point. On February 26, 2011,
in response to large-scale attacks by forces of the Gaddafi regime
against civilians, the SC adopted Resolution 1970, which
referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal
Court and imposed an arms embargo as well as sanctions aimed
at the regime and its leaders.71 Fears of mass atrocities were
aggravated in the course of the subsequent weeks as regime
forces rapidly approached the city of Bengazi, the largest rebel
stronghold, while Gaddafi himself declared that he would show
"no mercy" to the rebels.71 Such concerns have led to the
adoption of SC Resolution 1973, which demanded the
"immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to
by force.") (emphasis added). The leaders stated, however, that "it is impossible to
imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power" so that "as long as Gaddafi is in
power, NATO and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians
remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds." Id.; see also Henderson, supra
note 58, at 777 ("Indeed, it is clear that the UK does not view regime change as a lawful
basis for the use of force under international law.").
68. See Gardam, Legal Restraints, supra note 22, at 305.
69. Id.
70. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). For a detailed review
of the events leading to the adoption of SC Resolution 1970, see Payandeh, supra note
23, at 372-75.
71. See Payandch, supra note 23, at 376-78 (reviewing the events lcading to the
adoption of SC Resolution 1973); see also Douglas Stanglin, Gadhaji Vows to Attack
Benghazi and Show 'No Mercy', USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2011), http:// wwwusatoday.com/
cotmmiifunities/ondeadline/post/2011/03/gadliafi-vows-to-retake-benghazi-and-show-
no-mercy/ 1.
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violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians . . . ."2
The resolution authorized the use of force for the protection of
civilians:
[The SC] [a] uthorizes Member States that have notified the
Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional
organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation
with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures . . .
to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of
attack in the Libyan Arabjamahiriva, including Benghazi, while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any
part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States
concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of
the measures they take pursuant to the authorization
conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council . . . .
It is widely agreed that "UNSC Resolution 1973 was
ambiguous on when force could be used in Libya."74 The main
legal controversy regarding the scope of the permission to use
force granted to intervening powers under Resolution 1973
concerned the quality of the required nexus between an attack
on Libyan military objectives and the purpose of protecting
civilians.7 5 The expression "all necessary measures" gives rise to
a spectrum of possible constructions. 7 A strict nexus
72. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 1. 1.
73. Id. 4 (emphasis added).
74. Lehmann, supra note 5. at 144; see Henderson, supra note 58, at 778
(conmenting on Resolution 1973, Henderson observed that "the problem of
ambiguity, intentional or otherwise, in the mandates of Chapter V II resolutions ... is
one that still persists"); see also ROBIN COLLINs, THINKING ABOUT LIBYA, THE
RLSPONSIBILITY TO PROTLCT AND RLGIML CHANGE: A "LLSSONs LEARNLD" 6 (2011),
("We can safely acknowledge that there was loose language within the central UN
resolution (1973) in regards to the use of force."): Payandch, supra note 23. at 399
( [T]he resolution chooses a considerably broad objective, the exact scope of which is
open to debate."); Kenneth Anderson, Strategic Ambiguity and Libya, OPINION JURIS
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/03/22/strategic-ambiguity-and-libya.
75 See Lehmann, supra note 5, at 130 ("What would be decisive in such
requirement of necessity is the quality of the nexus between the objective to be
achieved and the actions undertaken.").
76. Lehinann thus observed, "On one side of the spectrum, a remote nexus. that
is one that takes a broad approach to necessity, would allow force that makes a positive
contribution to the mandate objective (namely, protection of civilians), irrespective of
whether that contribution is characterized as one of direct effect. For instance. when
the Gaddali Regime launched indiscriminate attacks, a way of stopping this was by
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requirement would allow Operating States to target only military
objectives that present an imminent threat to civilians.77 A more
moderate nexus requirement along the spectrum would
examine the individual dangerousness of a military objective
regardless of whether or not the threat it poses is imminent.78
The broadest conception of the nexus requirement would
suggest that given the general dangerousness of the Gaddafi
regime, any military objective enhancing the strength of the
regime in general is a legitimate target.7 9
Legal literature discusses additional questions that may be
viewed as derivatives of the nexus question. These questions
concern the permissibility of targeting Gaddafi;80 whether or not
the intervening powers could legitimately aim to affect a change
of regime in Libya;81 the extent to which the mandate allows the
fighting that regime in general, by attacking military and political leaders. Under such
dictum, Resolution 1973 would have had no limiting effect on the use of force
exceeding [international humanitarian law] IHI. On the other side of the spectrum,
where there is an extremely strict nexus, the jus in bello would be considerably
restricted: only military objects having a direct effect on the indiscriminatC violence
against civilians might then be targeted. The term 'necessary' (necessaire/necesaria)
alone is ambiguous on the quality of the link between objective and action. Only if it is
understood in its first synonym 'indispcnsablc' (i.e. 'absolutely necessary or requisite'),
the link is close." Id. at 130-3 1.
77. Id. at 120.
78. Under such rule of engagement, past occurrence of indiscriminate violence
(as an indication of intent), combined with the capacity of the particular military
objective to rcpcat it would fulfill the nexus requirement.
79. See Payandeh, supra note 23, at 384 (contending that " [i]n light of the general
consensus that the Libyan regime committed illegal violence against civilians, the
authorization of the use of force to protect civilians is considerably broad and includes
military action against the regime whenever there is a threat that the regime attacks
civilians or civilian-populated areas"). Payandeh thus submits, -[a]ttacks on military
facilities were therefore generally encompassed by Resolution 1973, as were attacks on
political institutions that were directly responsible for and involved with the Libyan
attacks on civilians." Id. at 390.
80. Commentators disagree on whether SC Resolution 1973 allowed targeting
Gaddafi. Lehinann argues that "there was consensus that Resolution 1973 precluded
targeting Gaddafi." Lehmann, supra note 5, at 143. Other commentators disagree,
contending that Gaddafi was a lkgitimatc target. See Payandch, supra note 23, at 390: see
also Henderson, supra note 58, at 775.
81. Commentators disagree on this question. Kohen, supra note 5, at 162 ("In
fact, the NATO bombings cearly deviated from its original goal to protect the civilian
population by actively supporting one side of the internal armed conflict between the
National Transition Council and the Gaddai dictatorship."); Henderson, supra note
58, at 772 ("Vhilst the opposition forces winning the civil war would in many respects
be a laudable outcome, it simply does not equate to the protection of civilians."). But
see Payandeh, supra note 23, at 387 (" [T]here are indications that the Security Council
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conduct of ground operations short of occupation;82 the
permissibility of military cooperation between the forces of the
intervening powers and rebel forces.8
Spelling out the nexus requirement by the drafters of
Resolution 1973 would enhance its clarity. Proponents of further
specification in SC resolutions concede, however, that
"[a] uthorization to engage in a large-scale, long-term military
operation will often be viewed as requiring that contractees be
granted broad discretion so that they can effectively operate and
cope with unpredictable military situations." 84
In the case of a humanitarian intervention authorized by
the SC, it is difficult to pre-assess at the drafting stage of the
mandate the gravity of the risks to the civilian population that
may arise as the crisis unfolds and the nature of the military
measures that would be required to thwart such risks. Such an
assessment concerns both the intent and the ability of regime
forces to inflict injury upon the civilian population.8
Assessments of intent and capacity to attack civilians are typically
mandate did not categorically rule out the possibility of regime change in Libya on the
basis of Resolution 1973.").
82. The authorization provided by Resolution 1973 excluded "a foreign
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory." S.C. Res. 1973, supra
note 1. 14. Payandch opined that "ground troops were allowed to be deployed to fight
directly against Libyan troops, though they were prohibited to besiege Libyan
territory." Payandch, supra note 23, at 386. But see Op-Ed., The Goal in Libya Is Not
Regime Change. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, available at http://www.n ytimes.com/2011/
03/24/opinion/24iht-edmoussa24.html (citing an interview with Arnr Moussa, Ex-
Secrctary (kncral of the Aiab League).
83. See Henderson, supra note 58, at 771-72.
84. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 127; see DE WET, supra note 45, at 269
("Defining the mandate cearly may not be as easy as it seems, as the Security Council
cannot, in advance, prescribe the military tactics of the authorised states, if they arc to
react effectively to unpredictable situations. These decisions have to be taken in the
field in the light of rapidly changing circumstances. As a result, ambiguous and broad
language cannot be avoided completely.").
85. Statements made by military commanders of the NATO powers operating in
Libya at the initial stage of hostilities acknowledged that such assessment ought to
guide NATO operations. General Carter Ham., US Chief of Staff for the intervention in
Libya, explained the rules of engagement for US forces as follows: "Where they see a
cear situation where civilians arc threatened, they have . . . intervened . . . . When
it's unclcar that it's civilians that are being attacked, the air crews arc instructed to be
very cautious . . . . What we look for, to the degree that we can, is to discern intent...
. There's no simple answer." Josh Rogin, Rules of Engagement are urky in Libya Air War,
FORLIGN POLICY (Mar. 21, 2011), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/
21/riiles_of engagement are murkyinlibya air war.
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intertwined. Intent on the part of regime forces is demonstrated
by prior and current conduct of such forces (e.g., prior
commission of atrocities against the population; current
movements of armed forces) 86 and by the statements of the
leaders. Therefore, the severity of the threat to the civilian
population, as far as intent is concerned, may be fully revealed
only in the course of the conflict.
Similarly, circumstances pertinent to the assessment of
ability to attack civilians (e.g., geographic vicinity of armed forces
to civilians; type of weapons held by regime forces and their
military capacity in general),7 may rapidly change, rendering
such assessment extremely dynamic. The weight attributed to
certain objective parameters (e.g., geographic vicinity to
civilians) in the assessment of risk may vary throughout the
conflict. For example, the risk to the civilian population in the
course of a "dynamic" civil war characterized by fast movements
of forces far exceeds the one arising in the course of a "static"
civil war.88 Whether the war takes a static or a dynamic form may
often be revealed only after the mandate has been drafted.
Moreover, although in view of the circumstances prevailing
in Libya throughout the military intervention Resolution 1973
probably did not allow military operations aimed at toppling the
Gaddafi regime," a drastic change of circumstances as the crisis
unfolded (e.g., increased commission of atrocities by regime
86. Elaborating on the circumstances pertinent to the assessment of threat to the
civilian population throughout the Libyan conflict, Lehmann observed: "What qualifies
as an indication of intent clear enough to satisfy the quality of the threat is to be
determined in each individual case. For ground forces, one indicator inay be direction
of movement. When Gaddafi forces seemed to be attacking, they might be targeted; in
cases of retreat, they might not. Another indicator may be geographic vicinity. It may
not be permissible to attack forces that arc rallying too remotely from civilians to pose a
threat to them. Movable military supply would appear to be a legitimate target if
designated for forces that are attacking civilians Lehmann, supra note 5, at 140.
87. Id.
88. See Henderson, supra note 58, at 772 ("Ultimately, although not a long-term
solution, a stalemate may well be the only outcome in which civilians are truly
protected. If one accepts this view then 'it may be lawful to assist the rebels to defend
the areas they hold but not to assist them to advance on other towns.'").
89. Lehmann, supra note 5, at 140 (" [P]rotecting civilians cannot be equated to
fighting the regime in support of one belligerent."); Henderson, supra note 58. at 772
("Whilst the opposition forces winning the civil war would in many respects be a
laudable outcome, it simply does not equate to the protection of civilians.").
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forces) could have brought such efforts within the contours of
the mandate."9 1
Proportionality analysis aimed at determining the scope of
permission to use force in the course of an SC-authorized
humanitarian intervention clearly extends beyond the purpose
of protecting civilians and encompasses risks to the forces of the
intervening power. As the military operation unfolds, such risks
also lend themselves to a clearer assessment than at the drafting
stage of the mandate.
In conclusion, it seems that the rules of engagement
emanating from proportionality balancing analysis may shift, as
the crisis unfolds, across a continuum of possible formulas.
Therefore, a mandate containing highly-specified terms
regarding the scope of permission to use force may prove to be
either overly broad, allowing military operations that may turn
out, as the conflict unfolds, to be disproportional to the purpose
of the mandate, or overly narrow, imposing unreasonable
limitations on the freedom of the intervening powers to act
given the aims of the operation (i.e., protecting the civilian
population) and the risk facing the forces of the intervening
power. Mandates that have the potential of being overly narrow
are likely to frustrate military efforts to achieve the purpose of
the mandate, and to inhibit military powers from assuming the
task of enforcing SC resolutions.
B. Past Practice of the Security Council: Bosnia and Somalia
Proponents of highly-specified mandates point to past
practice of the SC, which demonstrates their feasibility. Jules
90. A similar contention can be raised with regard to the provision contained in
Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of military force to protect "civilian populated
areas" in addition to the permission to protect civilians. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 1,
1 4. This language could be construed either to allow the use of force against military
objetives engaged in any forim of hostilities within a populated area or to allow the use
of foi only to prevent attacks that are contrary to humanitarian law, that is,
indiscimi ate attacks against civilian populated areas. Compare Payandeh, supra note 23,
at 386 (construing it the forimer), with Lehmann, supra note 5, at 136 (construing it as
the later). An authorization adhering to the forimer interpretation with regard to all
populated areas in Libya seems tantamount to an authorization to affect a regime
change. Although such a ineasure may appear to be inconsistent with the principle of
proportLionaliLy al[ the tillie of Lhe drafting of the resolution, subsequent events, as the
crisis unfolds can bring it within the scope of this principle.
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Lobel and Michael Ratner note that "in Bosnia, the Council
enacted specific resolutions, first to authorize force to secure the
delivery of humanitarian supplies, next to enforce the no-fly
zone, and then to protect the safe havens."9' The SC took a
similar approach regarding the humanitarian intervention in
Somalia.9 More recently, the mandate to use force granted by
the SC to French forces and special UN operation forces in C6te
d'Ivoire was more circumscribed than the one allowing military
operations in Libya in extending only to the protection of
civilians under imminent threat of violence.93 Lobel and Ratner
argue that the cases of Bosnia and Somalia suggest "that
relatively narrow authorizations are workable; and that
contractee states can be required to seek new authorizations to
undertake expanded uses of force."
Proponents of an increased specification regime concede,
however, that past practice may have limited value in assessing
the feasibility of such a regime with regard to high-stakes
conflicts. Lobel and Ratner acknowledged that:
[I] t could be argued that these recent efforts by the Security
Council to control the scope and extent of the uses of force
add little to our understanding. In contrast to the Korean
and gulf wars, they involved relatively small-scale operations
in which the major powers were reluctant to employ force.
Thus, in the Bosnia crisis, the Western states and Russia
were cautious or opposed to the assertive use of force, and
often rejected draft resolutions proposed by the nonaligned
members of the Security Council seeking broad
authorizations. Similarly, in Somalia the United States
initially, and at various points thereafter, sought to narrow
the objective for which force would be used, while the
Secretary-General pushed to widen the mandate. In these
91. Lobel & Rainer, supra note 10, at 141.
92. See id. at 141-42 ("In Somalia, the initial Resolution 794 authorized 'the
SecreLtary-Gencral and Member States ... to use all necessary mcans to establish ... a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations . ... Ater the attacks against
the UN troops by the forces of General Aid, the Security Council explicitly authorized
his arrest in Resolution 837. The Council and participating states did not rely on the
arguably broad language of Resolution 794, but specifically authorized each escalation
of force.").
93. S.C. Res. 1975, 1 6. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011); see also
Henderson, supra note 58, at 768.
94. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 142.
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situations, the major powers often willingly accepted
temporal and substantive controls on the use of force,
restrictions that would have been rejected in a major war in
which a permanent member had substantial interests.95
Indeed, the practice of the SC with regard to Bosnia of
repeatedly expanding the scope of permission to use force in
order to achieve the humanitarian objective of the military
intervention demonstrates that resolutions defining permission
very specifically will often yield overly narrow mandates.
Although the political circumstances surrounding the Bosnia
crisis allowed the expansion of the original, overly narrow
mandate by subsequent SC resolutions, Operating States can
hardly be expected to rely on such precedent in the context of
more substantial conflicts such as the one in Libya.
The point bears emphasis: notwithstanding the agency
rhetoric underlying the authorization model,96 states going to
war in the name of the international community have political
stakes in winning the war (i.e., achieving the goals of the military
intervention) that exceed those of other states. The nature and
weight of such political stakes, unique to the Operating States,
may vary from one situation to another. Therefore, in the case
of a high-stakes conflict, states would probably be reluctant to
serve as the military arm of the SC in a war whose outcome
depends on the future discretion of other states, members of the
SC, whether or not to permit the use of military measures
necessary to achieve the purposes of the intervention.
C. Temporal Limitations on Authorizations to Use Force
Commentators have contended that SC resolutions
authorizing the use of force should stipulate a time limit for the
intervention, "forcing the members of the Security Council to
re-evaluate the situation and the intervention and, if necessary,
95. Id. at 143-44. This observation proved accurate, as Resolution 1973
authorizing the military intervention in Libya "constitutes a return to the problematic
approach employed by Resolution 678. With the 'protection of civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat of attack,' the resolution chooses a considerably broad
objective, the exact scope of which is open to debate." Payandch, supra note 23. at 399.
96. See Schachter, supra note 29, at 72 (commenting on the SC-authorized military
irntevention in Korea and observing that "the U.S. government described itsclf as the
'Exccutive Agent of the United Nations' in its agreements with other participating
states for troop contributions").
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to make adjustments to the mandate." 9  Such "sunset clauses"
were contained in resolutions authorizing interventions in
Rwanda and Somalia, in the wake of the international
controversy regarding the American and British understanding
of Resolution 678 as an open-ended authorization to use force
against Iraq."
It has been noted that temporal limitations cannot
guarantee strict SC control over a military intervention as they
"would not affect the virtually absolute unaccountability of
Member States until the expiring of the deadline."" Indeed, a
temporal framework of several months would often allow
Operating States ample time to pursue military campaigns and
successfully advance political ends that grossly exceed the scope
of the mandate, especially in view of the unequivocal military
superiority typically enjoyed by such powers. 00
In theory, the SC could stipulate extremely tight temporal
limitations that would allow it to "dynamically tailor its response
to a situation as it unfolds." 101 But the purely political nature of
the SC may preclude such dynamic response on the part of the
SC. In cases of humanitarian interventions, for example, the
objectives of a mandate to protect civilians cannot be reconciled
with termination of the intervention in a manner that does not
provide any guarantee of their safety. Tight temporal limitations
could therefore prove to be a type of overly-narrow mandate,
97. Payandch, supra note 23, at 400; see Janes Cockayne & David Malone, The UTN
Secaity Coucl: 1OLessonsfrn Iraq on Regulatior andAccountability, 2J. INT'L L & INT'L
REL. 1, 16-17 (2006); Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 143 (arguing that resolutions
authorizing the use of force "should be temporally limited"); Jared Schott, Chapter II
as Exception: Security CouncilAction and the Regulative Ideal ofEmergency, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 24, 50 (2007) (advocating temporal limitations, Schott argues "[n] ccessity
and proportionality demand that the Council dynamically tailor its response to a
situation as it unfolds to prevent Chapter V II from becoming a permanent fixture....
[O]nce an operation is established the operational flexibility and authority provided by
ChapterT I1 authority has a 'narcotic effect').
98. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 142; see S.C. Res. 929, [ 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/929 (June 22, 1994); S.C. Res. 814, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993);
Cockayne & Malone, supra note 97, at 17 (observing that the controversy surrounding
the US and UK interpretation of Resolution 678 "has probably cemented the practice
of the Council specifying an end-date for delegated mandates: since the late 1990s,
France has asserted that it would never again accept open-ended sanctions reginies").
99. Gazzini, supra note 47, at 53.
100. SC authorizations to use force in Somalia usually provided for six-month
mLiandates, periodically renewed by the SC. See, e.g, S.C. Res. 814, supra not 98, i 6.
101. Schott, supra note 97, at 50.
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frustrating good-faith efforts on the part of Operating States to
meet the objectives of the mandate, and would most likely
inhibit states from undertaking this function.
III. A PROPOSED OVERSIGHT MECLANISM
A. Purpose and Tasks of the Proposed Committee
Reforming the SC's practice, as proposed in this Article,
would promote consonance between the aims of an SC
authorization to use force and measures taken by the Operating
States, relieving the crisis of trust that currently encumbers the
functioning of the collective security mechanism of the SC. The
reform would introduce an oversight mechanism in the SC
system to reduce significantly the ability of Operating States to
conduct military operations that depart from the terms
authorized by an SC resolution to use force.
Political feasibility represents a substantial but not
insurmountable challenge to such an effort. It seems that all
permanent SC members, including those that have traditionally
been more hesitant to use the collective security mechanism,
share a strong incentive to resolve the current crisis of trust. 1o
Commentators have noted that the increased reluctance on the
part of certain permanent SC members to allow the use of the
SC collective security mechanism, following the current crisis of
trust, will eventually "undermine the Security Council's role in
multilateral collective security and probably increase the
unilateral uses of force by militarily powerful nations." os All
permanent members of the SC share an obvious interest in
maintaining the monopoly of the SC over the uses of force
except in the exercise of the right of self-defense. An erosion of
102. See, e.g., Mohamed, supra note 2, at 329 (observing that in the discussions
held by the SC, Russia and China were among those members of the SC that warned
against accepting the responsibility to protect doctrine).
103. Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 130: see also INT'L COMMN ON
INTERNTNTION & STATE SOFRFIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1 (2001)
(cautioning that the Security Council will lose legitinacy if it fails to fulfill its
responsibility to act in the face of humanitarian crises); see also Mohamed, supra note 2,
at 326.
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this authority would diminish the unique political power
conferred upon permanent SC members by the UN Charter. 104
Moreover, the inequality inherent in the current collective
security mechanism has long been the subject of sharp criticism,
and many reform proposals have suggested limiting or diluting
the exclusive powers enjoyed by permanent SC members.1o5 The
inability of the SC to overcome the differences between
permanent members, and the fact that the impasse reached by
the SC is causing loss of lives serves as ammunition to those
calling for reform limiting the powers of the permanent
members.
Any reform introducing a control mechanism over the
implementation of SC resolutions entails certain political costs
for permanent SC members and for other states acting pursuant
to such resolutions. Because permanent members of the SC are
often among the Operating States, the use of any meaningful
oversight process within the collective security mechanism as a
guarantee against the abuse of an SC resolution by Operating
States requires imposing some form of limitation on the veto
power of permanent members. In the past, permanent SC
members have expressed strong reluctance to cede any aspect of
their veto power.'on They are likely to be especially opposed to
surrendering their power to veto changes to SC resolutions
authorizing military interventions in which they are acting as
Operating States in a high-stakes armed conflict. Revoking the
veto power of permanent members may also inhibit states that
are not permanent SC members from acting as Operating States
together with their permanent member allies because they will
no longer enjoy the protection afforded by the veto power of the
permanent members. Therefore, a politically feasible reform
that introduces an oversight mechanism within the SC system as
a guarantee against the hijacking of SC resolutions must
minimize political costs for both permanent SC members and
104. See Krisch, supra note 9, at 145 (observing that the position conferred on
permanent S incinbers under the UN Charter "facilitates their exercise of dominance
and, as institutional privilege is somewhat insulated froin shifts in naterial power, it
also stabilizes their continuing dominance into the firture").
105. See supra note 22.
106. See, e.g., Kairul Hossain, The Challenge and Prospect of Security Council Reform,
The Challenge and Prospect ofSecurty Council, 7 REGENTJ. OF INT'L L. 299, 309 (2010).
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for other states acting in accordance with an SC authorization to
use force.
The present article attempts to meet this challenge by
bringing together the "culture of law" and the "ethos of
diplomacy." 111 It proposes a mechanism whereby a permanent
UN committee of legal experts would monitor the compatibility
of military operations undertaken by a state pursuant to an SC
resolution with the terms of the resolution. A monitoring role of
this type would require the committee, an intermediary body
between the SC and the Operating States, to interpret and
clarify the authorization provided by the SC. As discussed below,
the committee's interpretation of the mandate and its views
regarding the operational consequences that such construction
entails would become binding upon the Operating States, unless
the SC explicitly decides otherwise.
The idea of establishing subsidiary SC organs aimed at
monitoring state compliance with SC resolutions is not new. The
SC has frequently resorted to such practice, establishing
sanctions committees for the monitoring and implementation of
sanctions imposed under Article 41 of the Charter, specifically
sanctions that do not involve the use of force.'18 The mechanism
proposed here differs significantly from the existing sanctions
107. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
108. For example, the Security Council ComnmittCe cstablished, pursuant to
Resolutions 751 for Somalia and 1907 for Eritrea. that the SC is authorized "to consider
and decide upon requests for exemptions" from the sanctions imposed and has the
power to add and remove individuals and enttics from the list of those to whom
sanctions apply. S.C. Res. 751. 1[ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992); see also S.C.
Res. 1907, 187, 1U.N. Doc. S/RES/1907 (Dec. 23, 2009). Similar powers are also
vested with other committees. See, e.g., Security Council Committee established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2048 concerning Guinea-Bissau. S.C. Res.
2048, 1 9, 1U.N. Doc. S/RES/2048 (May 18, 2012); Security Council Committee
established pursuant to Resolution 1970 concerning Libya, S.C. Res. 1970, 1 24, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/ 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); Security Council Conmittce established pursuant to
Resolution 1591 concerning the Sudan, S.C. Res. 1591, 1 3, 1U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1591
(Mar. 29, 2005); Security Council ConmittCe cstablishcd pursuant to Resolution 1572
concerning Cte d'Ivoire. S.C. Res. 1572, 1 14. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004);
Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 concerning the
Democratic Republic of thc Congo, S.C. Res. 1533, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1533 (Mar. 12,
2004); S.C. Res. 1989, 1 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011); Security Council
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1521 concerning Liberia, S.C. Res. 1521,
1 21. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 (Dec. 22. 2003); Security Council Cormnitte establishcd
pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1989 concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals
and entities, S.C. Res. 1267, 1 6, 1U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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committees not only in the subject matter of its monitoring
function but also in the nature of the mechanisms. Sanctions
committees are political bodies consisting of representatives of
all members of the SC and acting by consensus, which allows
each member of the SC to prevent any action that is contrary to
its interests."os By contrast, the committee proposed here would
be an independent, quasi-judicial body whose conclusions may
be unfavorable to SC members. Because of these differences,
political feasibility concerns that do not arise with regard to
existing sanctions committees bear heavily on the structuring of
the model advanced here. Nevertheless, the model of existing
sanctions committees provides a helpful point of reference in
determining the best way of introducing the proposed oversight
mechanism and the administrative framework that would govern
its operation.
B. Legal Basis for Establishing the Committee
The proposed mechanism may be established in two ways:
through an amendment to the UN Charter or by SC action in
the exercise of its current powers to regulate its operations.
Establishing the committee by amending the Charter may be
preferable from the point of view of legitimacy, but the difficulty
of amending the Charter reduces the likelihood that such a
change will take place."o Thus, from the point of view of
109. See Kalyani Munshani, The Essence of Terrorist Finance: An Empirical Study oJ the
UN. Sanctions Committee and the UN. Consolidated List, 19 MICH. ST.J. INT'l L. 229, 238
(2010) (arguing, with regard to the operation of the U.N. Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions
Committee, that the "consensus process, therefore, can be viewed as serving as an
effective restraint or check in the decision-making process"); Paul Conlon. Lessons firon
Iraq: The unctions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a Source of Sanctions Inplementation
Authorty ad Pctice, 35 VA. J. INT'L . 633, 647 n.73 (1995) (noting "the consensus
principle universally applied in all subsidiary organs of the Security Council").
110. Ai tice 108 of the UN Charter determines that: "Amendments to the present
Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have
been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and
ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the
Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security
Council". U.N. Charter, art. 108. For discussion of the challenges involv ed in amending
the Charter, see airolyn L. Willson, Changing the Charter. The United Nations Prepares for
the Twenty-First C 'ntuy, 90 AM. J. INT'l L. 1 15 (1996). See also Blum, supra note 21, at
648 ("The UN Charter has frequently been called a 'rigid' constitution, which certainly
explains the infrequency of Charter amendments since the Organization's
establishment six decades ago. . . . This paucity of Charter amendments is not
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efficiency it would be preferable to introduce the proposed
mechanism by SC action under Ar ticle 29 of the United Nations
Charter, which authorizes the SC to "establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions." ''
The SC has frequently exercised its powers under Article
29, establishing a wide variety of subsidiary bodies, including
missions, field offices, working groups, and committees. 112 To
facilitate the exercise of its Article 29 powers, the SC enacted
Rule 28 of its Provisional Rules of Procedure, which provides
that "The Security Council may appoint a commission or
committee or a rapporteur for a specified question."11  The SC
has resorted to Rule 28 several times in establishing sanctions
committees for monitoring sanctions imposed in accordance
with Article 41 of the Charter.1 4 To the extent that the language
of Rule 28 concerning the establishment of subsidiary organs
"for a specified question" does not accommodate the
establishment of a permanent committee, the SC may revise its
language or incorporate a new rule into its Provisional Rules of
Procedure to allow it to fully exercise its authority under Article
29 of the Charter.
C. Permanence of the Committee
The sanctions committees discussed above are temporary,
ad hoc committees established to monitor a particular
situation." 1 Unlike economic sanctions, which often last for
years, the timeframe for the use of force under Chapter VII is
relatively short, extending from the adoption of an SC
resolution authorizing the use of force to the initiation of
surprising, given the cumbersome process provided for adopting them."). On the other
hand, it must be noted that because amendnint of the UN Charter requires the
agreement of two thirds of the member states of the UN, changes to existing practices
made through Charter amendments reflect a democratic decision of member statCs:
infra note 124.
111. U.N. Charter, art. 29.
112. See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Subsidiary Organs: Overview,
UNITLD NATIONS, http://www.un.org/cn/sc/repertoire/subsidiary-organs/
overview.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
113. SC Provisional Rule 28, supra lotc 17.
114. See supra note 108.
1 15. Id.
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military enforcement measures on the part of the Operating
States. For this reason, we believe that the committee should be
a permanent body that assumes its role automatically when a
resolution authorizing the use of force is adopted, rather than
an ad hoc body that must be constituted anew and whose
members must be agreed upon each time the SC authorizes the
use of force. The model of ad hoc committees would turn the
monitoring mechanism into yet another obstacle to the function
of the collective security mechanism rather than facilitate its
operation. The permanence of the committee will also increase
its independence and allow it to develop expertise, which would
further enhance its legitimacy.' I
D. Election of Committee Mlembers
Our proposal for electing committee members is informed
by considerations of legitimacy as well as of political feasibility.
The former calls for an election process that involves all
member states of the United Nations, whereas the latter requires
maintaining primary control in the hands of the SC.
Several election processes that the UN employs involve both
the General Assembly and the SC. For example, judges of the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") are elected from among
nominees offered by national groups, which may suggest the
names of up to four people, no more than two of whom are
their own nationals. 17 The Secretary General then compiles an
alphabetical list of the names, which is submitted to both the
General Assembly and to the SC."B To be elected to the Court,
lI16. The claim that permanent dispute resolution bodies were inherently more
professional and independent than dispute resolution bodies established ad hoc has
been made with regard to other international quasi-Judicial entities. For examplc,
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring argue, with regard to WTO dispute
resolution panels, that "in contrast to the Appellate Body Members who are appointed
for several years, one cannot expect that the ad-hoc appointed panel members will act as
resolutely as the members of a permanent institution with regard to the outlined
problems of fact finding." See Claus-Dietcr Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, WTO Dispute
Settlement and Competition Law: Viewsfirom the Perspective of the Appellate Body's Experience,
26 FORDHAM INT'L 1. J. 1505, 1553 (2002).
117. See Statutc of the International Court of Justice, art., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1179 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
118. Id. art. 7.
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candidates must receive an absolute majority in both the
General Assembly and in the SC.119
A different procedure governs the election of the fourteen
permanent judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). All member states of the
United Nations are invited to nominate candidates. The
Secretary General compiles a list of these nominees and submits
it to the SC, which then establishes a list of no fewer than twenty-
eight and no more than forty-two candidates.120 This list is
submitted to the General Assembly, which selects from it the
fourteen permanent judges of the ICTY.'E 2 The procedure for
electing judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") is similar.12
We suggest modeling the procedure for electing members
of the committee after the procedure for electing judges of the
ICTY and the ICTR, both tribunals established by SC
resolutions." This procedure allows for the participation of all
member states of the UN, which strengthens its democratic
nature, and at the same time retains considerable power in the
hands of the SC.'14 We recommend electing fourteen members,
which would allow the formation of two seven-member panels.
The Secretary General of the United Nations would be
responsible for nominating panel members from among the
fourteen members of the committee. Similarly to the procedure
119. Id. arts. 7-10.
120. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res 827, art. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
121. See id.
122. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art.
12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
123. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") was
established by S.C. Resolution 827, for the purpose of "prosecuting persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be deterineind by the
Security Council upon the restoration of peace . . . ." ICTY Statute, supra note 120. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rvanda was establishcd by S.C. Res. 955, supra
note 122.
124. See Blum, supra note 21, at 645 (" [T]he General Assembly has frequently
been referred to as the 'democratic' organ of the United Nations. If 'democracy' and
'equality are the watchwords of the General Assembly, they clearly do not apply-and
were not intended to apply-to the Security Council."). Blum thus subscribes to the
view that "for any reform proposals of the Security Council to stand a chance of
success. the criteria of 'responsibility' and 'cffectiveness' [must] be mixed with a
healthy dose of 'representation' and 'democracy."' Id.
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for the election of the permanent judges of the ICTY and the
ICTR, the SC would establish a list of twenty-eight to forty-two
candidates, which would be submitted to the General Assembly
to elect the fourteen committee members.
The ICTY's and the ICTR's election model is the preferred
one for considerations of both political feasibility and
legitimacy. Retaining the final power of appointment in the
hands of the SC ensures that the SC would not object to the
election process. The decision of the SC to opt for this election
model in the past, albeit in a different context, provides further
indication that its introduction under the proposed reform
would enhance the prospects of the SC adopting the reform, or
at the very least would not hurt them. Moreover, this election
process has already been used several times and was proven to
be workable.' 1 Inclusion of the General Assembly in the
election process of the committee would render the process
more inclusive, enhancing its legitimacy in the eyes of member
states. This is consistent with most proposals for UN and SC
reform.126
It is important to point out that these election processes
have been criticized and that scholars have noted, for example,
the politicization of the election process of judges of the ICJ.'27
The criticisms of judicial tribunals' election process, however,
are of limited relevance to the appointment of the committee.
Institutional independence is an important characteristic of a
legitimate court system, in particular in light of judicial review,
where the courts rule on the legality of actions taken by other
125. For the list of present ICTY judges elected by the General Assembly, see
United Nations ICTY-TPIY. About the ICTY, http://wmy.icty.org/sections/
AboutthelCTY (last isited Nov. 17, 2012). For the list of present International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") judges elected by the General Assembly, see United
Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rvanda, About ICTR.
http:,// wy.unictr.org/tabid/l1 l/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
126. See, e.g., Hossain, supra note 21, at 300 ("Based mainly on the perceived need
for equitable representation. the idea of reform encouraged an increase in the number
of members seated on the Security Council. Membership was increased from eleven to
fifteen in 1965, but the number of U.N. member states has significantly increased
thereafter. The argument in favor of reform was that the Security Council does not
clearly represent the whole membership of the U.N.") (citations omitted).
127. CTR. FOR INT'L COLRTS & TRIBUNALS, UNIV. COLLEGE LONDON. SELECTING
INTERNATIONAL JLDGLS: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND POLITICS 19 (2008), available at
http://Tw I.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/SelectingIntJudges.pdf.
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branches of government.2 8 The committee we propose here,
however, will not have judicial review powers over the SC itself
(i.e., the power to examine the legality of SC resolutions).1 29
Rather, the committee would be established as a quasi-judicial
body that operates under the auspices of the SC. Although the
committee would be independent in conducting its work and
drawing its conclusions, the ultimate authority with regard to
the collective use of force remains, in our model, in the hands of
the SC.
E. Qualfications of Comnmittee iembers
For the proposed mechanism to succeed, it is essential that
committee members have international stature and be perceived
as being both professional and independent. Although the
committee is not a judicial tribunal, it may aptly be described as
a quasi-judicial body because its function of interpreting SC
resolutions and applying such interpretations to particular
situations is of a legal nature and has judicial characteristics.so
Based on rules stipulating various qualification requirements for
membership of international tribunals and quasi-judicial treaty-
bodies, we suggest that committee members be "persons of high
moral character, integrity and impartiality, with recognized
expertise in the fields of international law and, in particular, the
law on the use of force." 14
128. THE FFDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
129. For sources addressing the issue of judicial review of SC resolutions, see supra
note 21.
130. Because SC resolutions are binding legal documents, the task of the
interpretation of such documents, in particular in light of the principles of
mnterpretation we propose, can aptly be described as a lkgal task. See i/nfa notes 138-50,
and accompanying text.
131. Judges of the IC1J, for example, are required to be "independent judges,
elcted regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character,
who possess the qualifieations required in their respective countries for appointment to
the highest judicial offices, or are juris consults of recognized competence in
international law." See ICJ Statute, supra note 117, art. 2. Judges of the ICTY and the
ICTR are required to be "persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity
who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to
the highest judicial offices," and the ICTY Statute determines that " [i]n the overall
composition of the Chambers due account shall be taken of the experience of the
judges in criminal law. international law. including international humanitarian law and
humnan rights law." See ICTY Statute, supra note 120, art. 13. Judges of the International
Criminal Court are required to possess established competence in either criminal law
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F. Working Method of the Committee
With the adoption of a resolution authorizing the use of
force, the Secretary General of the United Nations would
appoint a seven-member panel from among the committee's
fourteen members to begin its oversight function. The panel
would be entitled to receive both solicited and unsolicited
information from any source, including states, media outlets,
NGOs, and private individuals, and would rely on such
information in its observations.
Resolution 1973 requests Operating States to inform the
Secretary General immediately of the military measures they
take pursuant to the authorization, and states that such
information "shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council."1 3,2 Although SC resolutions authorizing the use of
force only "request" Operating States to report to the SC "states
seem to regard themselves as obliged to give effect to this
request." 3 We recommend that Operating States be bound by
such reporting requirement both to the SC and to the
committee. But Operating States would not be required to
provide information that they believe may endanger their troops
and weaken their military position if it were known to the
enemy. Such a requirement would be unrealistic'34 and would
diminish the willingness of states to carry out SC resolutions
authorizing the use of force.
and procedure or in relevant areas of international law. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. art. 36, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), 37
I.L.M. 999. Members of quasi-judicial committees and panels are generally required to
possess more modest qualifications. Members of the UN Human Rights Conmittee, for
examplc, are required to be "independent experts who are persons of high moral
character and recognized competence in the Held of human rights." International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 'While
members are not required to be jurists, the Covenant indicates that "consideration [is]
being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal
experience." Id. Since the proposed committee is not a judicial tribunal, it seems not
only unnecessary to require that its members possess the qualifications required to hold
judicial ofices in their respective countries but also undesired from a political
perspective, since it may characterize the committee as a court, which may, in turn,
detcr Operating States from action. On the other hand, the Committee would be
required to interpret SC resolutions, a task that is of a legal nature.
132. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 1, 1[ 4.
133. DLTT, supra note 45, at 272.
134. Id. at 273.
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In examining the compatibility of the actions of Operating
States with the mandate provided by the resolution, the panel
would be authorized to appoint a team of experts to assist in
gathering, analyzing, and assessing the relevant information.
The sanctions committees commonly rely on the assistance
of experts. SC resolutions establishing sanctions committees
have often also established a group or panel of experts to assist
the committees.1 5 The Secretary General of the United Nations
appoints the experts. In contrast with sanctions committees,
however, the proposed committee would not be a political arm
of the SC but rather a professional body. It is therefore
reasonable to allow the committee itself to designate the matters
for which it would require expert assistance, but for reasons of
administrative convenience the formal appointment should be
made by the Secretary General upon the request of the
committee.
Having reviewed the available information, and before
submitting any observations and clarifications to the SC, the
panel would be required to give the Operating States an
opportunity to respond to any concerns the panel may have
regarding the compatibility of their operations with the
mandate.
For reasons of efficiency, we propose that the committee
make its decisions by majority vote.,' To strengthen the
independence of committee members and to reduce the
political pressures on them, we recommend that submissions to
135. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 1, 1[1[ 13-14. 15. 17, 19, 23-26 (stating that
S.C. Resolution 1970 established a committee to monitor the implementation of the
sanctions imposed on the Libyan regine under the resolution). Resolution 1973
requested the Secretary General to create, in consultation with the sanction committee,
a group of up to eight experts, under the direction of the committee, to assist the
committee in performing its tasks). Id. J[ 24; see also S.C. Res 1929. 1[ 29, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010) (requesting the Secretary General to establish a group of
eight experts to assist the Iran sanctions committee in its work); S.C. Res. 1591, 1 3(b),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005) (deciding to establish a Panel of Experts to
assist the Sudan sanctions committice).
136. See id. (stating that while other subsidiary bodies, such as sanction
committees, operate by consensus. a requirement of consensus has the potential of
seriously impairing the coLmuittc' s efficiency and tre effectiveness of its
recommendations).
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the SC be signed by the committee as a whole and that
individual opinions not be published.)
G. The Interpretative Role of the Committee
One of the central functions of the committee would be
interpreting SC resolutions. As commentators have noted, the
SC's subsidiary organs often interpret SC resolutions while
performing their functions, and their interpretation is binding if
the relevant resolutions so determine. 8
There is no coherent body of law specifying the principles
of SC-resolution imterpretation. However, the ICJ in the 1971
Namibia Advisory Opinion provided some guidance. The ICJ
observed that an SC resolution should be construed "having
regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the
discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in
general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the
legal consequences of the resolution. "1
Scholars who have addressed the issue offered several
guiding principles for such interpretation. For example, Michael
Wood proposed a model of interpretation based on the
principles governing the construction of treaties, stipulated in
Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. 140 Wood conceded, however, that the analogy with the
construction of treaties is of limited reach because "the
differences are very great."' 4 ' 1 Unlike treaties, SC resolutions are
often drafted hastily, contain internal inconsistencies, and lack
137. Rules of Procedure of the Court of justice, art. 64.2, 2012 O.J. 1, 265/1
(showing how this suggestion draws on the model of the European Court of Justice,
where all judges that deliberated a particular case sign the court's decision).
138. Wood, supra note 18, at 84 (mentioning the ICTY, as well as the ICTR, the
United Nation's Clains Commission, and the Sanctions Committees as examples of
bodies that produce binding interpretation of SC resolutions).
139. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Nanibia (W. Ar.) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 53 (June 21). Michael Wood observed that "thc Court was not
necessarily making a general statement about the interpretation of SCRs [Security
Council resolutions], but was dealing with the question whether particular SCRs had
binding effect. But its remarks in this case may offer somie guidance to the more
general issues." Wood, supra note 18, at 75.
140. See Wood, supra note 18, at 88-95; see alsoVienna Convention on the Law of
Treatics arts. 31-33, May 23. 1969. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
141. Id.
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the preciseness of treaties. There is little dispute, however, that
the text of an SC resolution is the starting point for
interpretation and that the general aim of interpretation should
be "to give effect to the intention of the Council as expressed by
the words used by the Council in the light of the surrounding
circumstances."l42 Such "surrounding circumstances" relevant to
the identification of the Council's intention include the
"legislative history" of the resolution, that is, documents
constituting the preparatory work leading to the adoption of a
resolution, as well as "statements made by Council members
(and by others) in the Security Council before and after
adoption." 4  They also include related SC resolutions both
preceding and following the adoption of the resolution at hand,
as " [u]nlike most treaties, SCRs [Security Council resolutions]
are often part of a series and it is only possible to understand
them as such." 44
The intention of the SC, however, cannot always be
identified. The difficulty in identifying the Council's intention
lies precisely in the type of situations the present article
addresses, one in which a resolution can be interpreted in good
faith in several ways. In these situations, the interpretation is
informed by external principles of international law, such as the
general principle of proportionality,145 the principles of
international humanitarian law"l+ and jus ad bellur, 4 and the
goals of the United Nations.
142. Id. For the view that interpretation of SC resolutions should rely primarily on
the resolution's text, see James ). Fry, Renaining Vadid: Security Council Resolutions,
Textualism, and the Invasion ofIraq, 15 TUi.J. INT'L & COMP L 609 (2007).
143. Wood, supra note 18, at 90, 93.
144. Id. at 87.
145. See Lehnann, supra note 5, at 133 (examining the scope of permission to use
force under SC Resolution 1973 and concluding that " [p]roportionality thus ought to
be a principle inherent in all Chapter VII UNSC Resolutions").
146. Lehmann submits that " [i]t would appear that at least the use of tLerns by the
UNSC is to be understood in accordance with IHL [international humanitarian law]
and that there is a presumption of compliance." Lehman resorts to the relationship
between Resolution 1973 and humanitarian law examining the contours of the
authorization to use all necessary mcans to protect "civilian inhabited areas under
threat of attack." Id. at 123, 135-36.
147. Observing that the tern "all necessary measures" used by the SC in
Resolution 1973 is ambiguous. Lchinann suggests that "analysis of the mcaning of the
term in other jus ad bellun situations may help to clarify its meaning." Id. at 13 1.
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Several authors have advocated a restrictive or at least
conservative approach to interpreting SC resolutions.148 Even
without ruling on the desirability of adopting a general principle
of restrictive interpretation, it seems safe to assume that a
committee of the type we describe, appointed in the manner we
suggest, will likely interpret resolutions in a more conservative
manner than would Operating States volunteering to carry out
such resolutions.
H. Status of the Committee Findings
It is the task of the committee to interpret SC resolutions
authorizing the use of force and to examine the compatibility of
military measures taken by Operating States with these
resolutions. Were the committee to find that the military
measures taken by Operating States exceeded the terms of the
SC resolution authorizing the use of force, it would submit
clarifications to the SC regarding the scope of the permission to
use force granted by the resolution. These clarifications may
include general legal guidelines (e.g., "the resolution authorizes
the use of force only against armed forces that present an
imminent threat to civilians") as well as operative
recommendations regarding acts that Operating States should
take or refrain from taking in order to bring their operations in
line with the resolution.
Michael Wood observed that " [o] nly the Security Council,
or some body authorized to do so by the Council, may give an
authentic interpretation in the true sense . . . . [T] he decisions
of the subsidiary organs are binding to the extent provided for
in the relevant SCRs [Security Council resolutions]."149 Because
an authentic interpretation of SC resolutions is legally binding
148. See N. Jansen Calainita, Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear
Issue, 42 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1393, 1415 (2009) ("A conservative approach to the
resolution of ambiguities safeguards the interpretative exercise from reading into the
text of the resolution what negotiation and drafting have failed to provide. Moreover,
given the usually self-assessed character of the interpretation of the Council's
resolutions. a restrictive approach may serve to place constraints on aggressive
unilateral interpretatLol or at least remove broad and malleable supporting principles
(on the international legal plane) from the consideration of the legitimacy of such
interpretations.") (Citations omitted). See also Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 125
("[A]mbiguous autforizaLtions should be narrowly construed.").
149. Wood, supra note 18, at 82-84.
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for all states involved, "the line between interpretation and
amendment is not always clear."15s Under the proposed
mechanism, the clarifications of the committee would have the
status of authentic interpretation of the resolution authorizing the
use of force, and its operative recommendations would become
binding for the Operating States, unless they were rejected
within two weeks of their submission by an SC resolution
adopted in accordance with the regular voting rules of the
Council. Hence, each permanent member of the SC would be
able to ensure the binding status of the committee's
clarifications by vetoing a resolution rejecting such clarifications.
Under the model we propose, the SC would authorize a
subsidiary organ to interpret and monitor its resolutions while
maintaining the ultimate authority over the operation of the
collective security mechanism. Because the powers to provide an
"authentic interpretation" of SC resolutions and to monitor the
execution of such resolutions are vested with the SC as part of its
exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, the authorization of the committee could be
perceived as a delegation of the powers of the SC. We believe
this model is compatible with the limits imposed on the ability of
the SC to delegate its powers.
Danesh Sarooshi defined the delegation of powers in the
international arena as "taking place whenever an organ of an
international organization which possesses an express or implied
power under its constituent instrument conveys the exercize
(sic) of this power to some other entity."'1' He explained that
"[a] delegation of powers does not involve the transfer of a
power in toto." 152 This implies a requirement that the delegating
organ retain the ability to both revoke the delegation of powers
and exercise its powers concurrently with the delegate.1
According to Sarooshi, "[t]he Security Council possesses a
general competence to delegate its powers to certain entities."'54
150. Id. at 84.
151. DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITE) NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THL UN SECURITY COUNCIL OFITS CHAPTER
VII POWERS 4-5 (1999).
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 16. This competence exiss both under tihe UN Charter and as a general
principle of the law of international organizations. Id. at 16-17.
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This competence, however, is not absolute, and limitations to
such delegation should be construed to ensure that the SC
retains ultimate authority for the maintenance of international
peace and security.'5 The proposed oversight mechanism is
consistent with this requirement because the SC does not cede
its powers under the UN Charter. Just as the SC can establish the
committee, it can disestablish it or revise its mandate. There is
nothing to prevent the SC from rejecting any clarifications the
committee may submit or from adopting resolutions that
concern the interpretation or execution of a previous resolution
authorizing the use of force. The responsibility for the operation
of the collective security mechanism would thus remain within
the hands of the SC.
Under our model, unless the SC decides otherwise, the
clarifications of the committee effectively become binding
interpretations of the initial resolution authorizing the use of
force. Sarooshi suggested that the ability of the SC to delegate
the power to issue binding decisions stems from the "general
competence of the Council to delegate its powers," provided
that the authority to issue binding decisions is conferred upon
the organ explicitly'6 and that the SC finds the delegation of
such authority to be "necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security."' 5 The SC may thus authorize
the committee to issue decisions that are binding upon states.151
In many cases the clarifications of the committee will be
binding because if the committee were to find that an operating
state overstepped the limits of the mandate to use force, it is
plausible that at least one permanent member of the SC will
veto a resolution that rejects the findings of the committee.
Although this is a probable scenario, it will not necessarily occur
in every instance. Political circumstances underlying the
agreement among permanent members of the SC on the initial
authorization to use force may also support continued
155. See id. at 36-41.
156. Id. at 109.
157. Id. at 107.
158. See id. (discussing a situation in which the SC delegated powers to the
international criminal tribunals to issuC dcuisions tha[ were binding on s~ttes with
regard to cooperation wvith the tribunals).
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consensus within the SC rejecting a narrow construction of such
authorization by the committee.
More important, however, is the ability of SC members that
are not Operating States to use the findings of the committee as
leverage in negotiating with Operating States the terms of their
continued discharge of the mandate. Faced with committee
clarifications that threaten to become binding, Operating States
may be more receptive to critique raised by other states
regarding their operations. A permanent member may offer to
withhold its objection to a resolution rejecting the clarifications
of the committee in exchange for the Operating States changing
their course of action. Thus, the clarifications of the committee
can serve as an incentive for members of the SC to renegotiate
the terms and conditions of the use of force. Whereas reluctance
to apply the conclusions reached by a legal body may be
problematic in a legal setting, the collective security mechanism
is essentially a political setting. In the context of the use of force,
a solution that is based on the agreement of SC members is not
only efficient but also reflects the basic principles of the Charter.
Our proposal may raise concerns about the need to
establish a new body to monitor the implementation of SC
authorizations to use force. It may be argued that the SC can
simply empower the Secretary General of the United Nations to
oversee the implementation of its resolutions rather than
establish a committee. The Secretary General oversaw the
execution of Chapter VII resolutions on at least two occasions.
In 1993, the SC adopted Resolution 814 on Somalia. Declaring
that it was acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the SC
requested that the Secretary General utilize the expanded UN
forces in Somalia ("UNOSOM II"),159 "to support from within
Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo" and "to
direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume
responsibility of the consolidation, expansion and maintenance
of a secure environment throughout Somalia."' o In the same
year, the SC adopted Resolution 836, which authorized member
states to take "all necessary measures, through the use of air
159. See S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993); Completed
Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., http:/www.un.org/cn
peacekccping/nmissions/pas tunosoim2.hti (ast visited Mar. 26, 2013).
160. S.C. Res. 814, 11 10, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
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power . . . to support [the United Nations Protective
Force] UNPROFOR," deployed in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, "subject to close coordination with the UN
Secretary General and UNPROFOR."'1' The SC explicitly
requested that the "Member States concerned, the Secretary
General and UNPROFOR . . . coordinate closely on the
measures they are taking . . . ."162 It was observed that the
Secretary General "interpreted the phrase 'coordinate closely'
to mean that his consent must be given, as the agent of the
Council, before air power can be used"b and that this
interpretation "received widespread support from many other
Council Members."l64
Commentators have questioned the relevance of the
Somalia and Bosnia precedents to the drafting of highly specific
authorizations to use force.165 The reasons they cited apply
equally to the possibility of granting extensive oversight powers
to the Secretary General. Here too, those precedents "add little
to our understanding," 166 as "they involved relatively small-scale
operations in which the major powers were reluctant to employ
force." 167 The interventions in Somalia and Bosnia involved
relatively little risk that the Operating States would grossly
exceed the limits of the mandate and were viewed by the
Operating States as "low-stakes" conflicts in which the potential
costs of an overly narrow construction of the mandate were not
substantial.168 Indeed, the disagreement between the United
States and the Secretary General with regard to the situation in
Somalia, the former seeking to narrow the scope of the mandate
to use force while the latter arguing that it should be
161. S.C. Res. 836, 1 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993).
162. Id. 1 11.
163. SAROOSH1, supra note 1 l, at 83.
164. Id.: see also Lobel & Ratner, supra note 10, at 141 ("In Bosnia, a dispute
between the United States and the SecreLtary-General arose as to whether air strikes
against Bosnian Serb targets had to be authorized by the Secretary-General and
approved by the UN commander. When most of its NATO allies supported the
SecreLtary-Gencral, the United States backed down and recognized UN authority. The
Somalia authorizations accorded substantial authority to the Secretary-General as
well.") (footnote omitted).
165. Lobel & Ratn, spra note 10, at 143-44: see also supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
166. Id. at 143.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 143-44.
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broadened, is revealing.16 The fundamental reluctance of all
permanent members of the SC to use force was the underlying
reason for their general willingness to accept various controls on
the use of force, including substantial oversight powers granted
to the Secretary General, "restrictions that would have been
rejected in a major war in which a permanent member had
substantial interests. "170
We noted above that the willingness of SC members to
accept the proposed oversight mechanism depends largely on
the international stature of committee members and their being
perceived as both highly professional and independent jurists.
In this respect, it seems that the proposed committee would be
better suited than the Secretary General to carry out the
oversight function proposed here. Replacing the proposed
committee with the Secretary General raises concerns of both
institutional and professional competence. The Secretary
General and the members of the SC coordinate on a variety of
situations and issues. Authorizing the Secretary General to issue
binding interpretations to SC resolutions can potentially lead to
tensions between the Secretary General and members of the SC,
which could have a negative effect on the working relations
between the two organs, and eventually weaken the UN.
Moreover, the tasks of interpreting SC resolutions and
examining state action in light of such interpretation, which we
propose to bestow on the committee, are quasi-judicial tasks and
as such subject to a strict requirement of objectivity. To maintain
such objectivity, the individuals examining a situation should
have no prior involvement with that situation, a requirement
that would be difficult to impose on the Secretary General, who
is often involved in political negotiations aimed at preventing
the need to use force, and in coordinating and supervising
169. Id. ("I] n Somalia the United States initially, and at various points thereafter,
sought to narrow the objective for which force would be used, while the Secretary-
General pushed to widen the mandate.").
170. Id. SC Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of force in Libya, requested
Operating States "to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-Gencral on
thc measures they are taking" to implement the resolution. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note
1, 10. However, there is no indication that either the Operating States or the
Secretary General viewed this provision as vesting the lattcr with substantial oversight
powers. The Resolution also rcqucsts Operating States to coordinate with each othier,
which supports the view that such coordination does not imply oversight powers.
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peacekeeping operations that precede the use of force. Finally,
the interpretation of SC resolutions is a legal task requiring legal
expertise, which the Secretary General does not necessarily
possess.
The model proposed here significantly moderates the risks
assumed by permanent SC members acting as Operating States,
compared to a model that allows the revocation of a mandate
altogether over the objection of a permanent SC member. By
contrast, the model proposed here would not expose Operating
States that volunteer to act as agents on behalf of the
international community to the risk of incurring the political
costs that may attach to a newly imposed legal obligation to
withdraw from a high-stakes armed conflict initiated by such
states at the bidding of the SC. Such an outcome, which may be
perceived by the Operating States as "losing the war," would
presumably be considered unacceptable to these states, and
therefore significantly diminish the feasibility of such a scheme.
Rather, the proposed model may require Operating States that
exceeded the original mandate only to make the necessary
adjustments that would bring their operations in line with the
mandate.
To some extent, the proposed model draws on the negative
(or reverse) consensus model embodied in the Understanding
on Riles and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("DSU") of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),171 which
regulates the resolution of all disputes arising under the main
HTO trade agreements. 7 2 The DSU provides for the resolution
of disputes through proceedings held before panels of
professional experts who submit recommendations to the
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), a political body comprised of
all members of the WTO.1> The recommendations submitted by
the panel of experts become binding upon adoption by the
DSB. 74 But under a reform to the dispute settlement
mechanism introduced in 1995, the decision of the DSB
171. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. Annex 2. 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
172. DSU, supra note 171 (providing the list of covered agreements is specified in
Appendix 1 to the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")).
173. DSU, supra note 171, art. 16.
174. Id.
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whether to adopt a recommendation submitted by a panel of
experts is governed by the rule of reverse consensus: unless all
members of the DSB, including the state filing the complaint,
agree otherwise, the decision to adopt the recommendation of
the panel is automatically accepted.17 5
The objective of this reform was to correct the systematic
deficiencies of the previous DSB voting system, which required
that panel recommendations be adopted by consensus, a
requirement that often led to stalled and ineffective
proceedings.17 The reform represents a precedent of the
willingness of states to cede veto powers within the framework of
an international organization in matters involving significant
national interests, as part of a shift from an "ethos of diplomacy"
to a "culture of law."1 7 Some have gone as far as arguing that
the reverse consensus amounts to forgoing elements of state
sovereignty. For example, Laurence Tribe argued before the
United States Congress:
[T]he "reverse consensus" requirement is a 180-degree
turnaround from prior GATT practice; it means that
individual nations, including the United States, no longer
maintain a de facto veto over GATT dispute panel decisions.
This turnaround ... is alone sufficient to distinguish the
Uruguay Round's potential effects on state sovereignty from
the effects of all previous GATT agreements.17 8
The example of the WTO reverse consensus mechanism
demonstrates that states may be willing to forgo considerable
powers to enable the operation of an international institution
they consider deserving. Although ability to appeal a panel's
decision mitigates, to some extent, the finality of panel
recommendations, 1 the reverse consensus mechanism remains
an example of a political body voluntarily limiting its powers for
the sake of strengthening the overall system of international
175. Id. art. 16.4.
176. See Art Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: Tie.J t gJ Jr ternational Trade
Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775. 796-801 (1997).
177. Weiler, supra note 13. at 181, 185. 187.
178. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Ambassador Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative (Nov. 22,
1994), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/gatt.htm.
179. See DSU, supra note 171, art. 17.
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cooperation. 180 The precedent of states forsaking their previous
veto powers indicates that it is politically feasible to agree upon
such a mechanism, at least under certain conditions.
CON CLUSION
The United States has voiced "disgust" 181 with the Russian
and Chinese veto of any Western initiative for SC action in Syria.
There seems to be a connecting thread between this disgust and
the distrust toward any similar initiatives displayed by Russia and
China following the NATO military intervention in Libya. The
chill of the crisis of trust between the permanent members of
the SC after the military intervention in Libya has brought the
operation of the SC collective security mechanism close to Cold
War temperature, as exemplified by the SC inaction in the face
of the atrocities in Syria.
The crisis of trust is the result of a lack of sufficient SC
control over the implementation of its resolutions authorizing
the use of force. Any reform in SC practices aimed at enhancing
such control would require that permanent members of the SC
cede certain aspects of their veto power. Such concessions
cannot be expected in the context of the purely political process
that currently characterizes the SC collective security
mechanism. But the experience of the WTO shows that member
states of an international organization can be more receptive to
concessions affecting their veto power within a context of
reform that brings together the "culture of law" and the "ethos
of diplomats." The present article proposes such a reform in the
practice of the SC in the form of an oversight mechanism that
would rely on the services of jurists but leave ultimate authority
over the operation of the collective security mechanism in the
hands of the SC.
180. It should be noted that some have claimed the requirement of adoption by
the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") distinguishes the HV1O dispute Settlement system
from a "truly judicial" system. See Claus-Dicter Ehlermann, Experiences from the VTO
Appellate Body, 38 TEX. INT'L L.. 469, 478 (2003).
181. Strong Words at UN. After Syria Veto, CNN (Feb. 5, 2012),
http://wwwcnnn.co/2012/02/04/worl/dmeast/syria-un-reiarks (quoting Susan
Rice, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, as saying "[t]he United States is
disgusted that a couple of members of this council continue to prevent us from
fulfilling our sole purpose here-addressing an ever-deepening crisis in Syria and a
growing threat to regional peace and security").
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The cornerstone of the proposed mechanism is the
establishment of a committee of legal experts whose
interpretation of SC resolutions authorizing the use of force
would be binding for Operating States unless the SC decided
otherwise. We suggest that such a reform is both politically
feasible and effective in promoting consonance between the
aims of SC authorizations to use force and the measures taken
by states acting upon such authorizations.
